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I. INTRODUCTION 
You can get further with a kind word and a gun than you can 
with just a kind word.1 
The Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause decisions of the last two 
decades lack the consistency necessary to guide lower courts on the 
extent of the congressional commerce power to regulate products that 
remain intrastate.  The current jurisprudence is muddled, and district 
courts have been inconsistent in this application of Congress’s 
Commerce Clause power.2  The perpetual battle between the Congress 
                                                                                                             
 1 THE UNTOUCHABLES (Paramount Pictures 1987). 
 2 Corey Rayburn Yung, One of These Laws is Not Like the Others: Why the Federal 
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act Raises New Constitutional Questions, 46 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369, 423 (2009).  See also, Jennifer A. Maier, Comment, Outgrowing 
the Commerce Clause: Finding Endangered Species a Home in the Constitutional 
Framework, 36 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 489, 506 (2006) (“Lopez and Morrison provided 
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and the states has escalated, with the former claiming authority to 
regulate behavior on a national level, and the latter declaring 
independence under the Tenth Amendment.  What at first looked like a 
coup by the Rehnquist Court to reestablish strong federalism instead led 
to a more invasive federal government and less power for the judiciary to 
review congressional authority.3  Even with significant scholarship 
begging for clarity4 and continued challenges in this new commerce 
power regime,5 the Supreme Court has not remedied the situation. 
The federal government now faces a challenge to the Commerce 
Clause6 that packs more firepower than most.  The Montana Firearms 
Freedom Act (MFFA),7 “declares that any firearms made and retained in-
state are beyond the authority of Congress under its constitutional power 
to regulate commerce among the states.”8  Montana asserts its Tenth 
Amendment powers to regulate intrastate commerce and challenges the 
federal government’s right to regulate the intrastate manufacture and 
possession of firearms.9  A lawsuit currently in federal court requests a 
declaratory judgment stating that Congress has no power to regulate guns 
manufactured and distributed in accordance with the MFFA.10  As of 
publication, seven other states have passed similar legislation.11 
                                                                                                             
little guidance on how to define the term, ‘economic,’ which has led to the arbitrary 
distinctions in Raich and will continue to cause confusion and inconsistency in Court 
opinions until the ambiguity is resolved.”); Amanda M. Jones, Gonzales v. Raich: How 
the Medical Marijuana Debate Invoked Commerce Clause Confusion, 28 HAWAII L. REV. 
261, 287 (2005) (“Because Raich and Lopez seem indistinguishable using Morrison’s 
four-factor test, confusion is inevitable.”); Kenton J. Skarin, Not All Violence is 
Commerce: Noneconomic, Violent Criminal Activity, RICO, and Limitations on Congress 
Under the Post Raich Commerce Clause, 13 TEX. REV. LAW & POL. 187, 190 (2009)  
(“However, the Court’s next major Commerce Clause decision, Gonzales v. Raich, 
created serious confusion among both lower courts and commentators as to the current 
state of Commerce Clause jurisprudence.”). 
 3 Ilya Somin, Gonzales v. Raich: Federalism as a Casualty of the War on Drugs, 15 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 507, 508 (2006); see generally, John W. Moorman, Note, 
Conflicting Commerce Clauses: How Raich and American Trucking Dishonor Their 
Doctrines, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 687 (2007). 
 4 See generally supra note 2. 
 5 E.g., United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010). 
 6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“[Congress shall have power] [t]o regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes. . . .”). 
 7 Montana Firearms Freedom Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-20-101–106 (2010). 
 8 The Firearms Freedom Act (FFA) is Sweeping the Nation., FIREARMS FREEDOM 
ACT (June 3, 2010), http://firearmsfreedomact.com. 
 9 Montana Firearms Freedom Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-20-101–106 (2010). 
 10 Notice of Appeal, Mont. Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, No. CV-09-147-M-
DWM-JCL (D. Mont. Filed Dec. 2, 2010). 
 11 Tennessee Firearms Freedom Act, TENN. CODE ANN. §4-54-101 (2010); Alaska 
Firearms Freedom Act, ALASKA STAT. § 44.99.500 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3114 
(LexisNexis 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-3315A (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-35-
2 (2010); Utah State-Made Firearms Protection Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-5b-
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The MFFA is not merely the work of the pro-gun lobby, nor is it an 
issue that is isolated to a few states.  The MFFA is a larger movement—a 
deliberate effort to challenge congressional authority.12  Although this 
statute relates to firearms, any challenge to Congress’s commerce power 
can have far-reaching consequences in the way the federal government 
operates and interacts with the states.  Litigation surrounding the MFFA 
could either severely limit the commerce power or affirm the force with 
which Congress currently wields that power. 
Following United States v. Lopez,13 circuit courts have evaluated 
federal statutes invoking the Commerce Clause by placing them into one 
of the three categories that Congress may regulate under the guise of 
interstate commerce.14  This Comment uncovers a fourth category that 
federal courts have yet to clearly articulate or recognize.  This unspoken 
category has been reserved for intrastate products — tangible objects that 
Congress is attempting to regulate — as opposed to intrastate activities.  
Evidence for this fourth category can be found by carefully reviewing the 
seminal Commerce Clause cases and analyzing recent decisions in the 
circuit courts. 
This Comment proposes, first, that the product-based analysis 
already exists and second, that it must now be expressly stated, with a 
clearly articulated test, in order to properly adjudicate cases when the 
regulation in question relates to a product that has not traveled in 
interstate commerce.  The inconsistent outcomes of cases that involve 
intrastate products can be explained by looking to the subject of the case.  
Medical marijuana, violence against women, wheat, and sex offender 
registries are very different from one another and thus, have been treated 
differently by courts, even though all have been unreasonably placed in 
the same Lopez category.  Few commentators have been willing to read 
between the lines and recognize the underlying issues involved in 
products cases, including the possibility of personal and societal biases 
based on the object in Congress’s crosshairs.15  It is time for current 
                                                                                                             
101 (LexisNexis 2010); Wyoming Firearms Freedom Act, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-401 
(2010). 
 12 See e.g. Barak Y. Orbach et. al., Arming States' Rights: Federalism, Private 
Lawmakers, and the Battering Ram Strategy, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 1161 (Winter 2010).  
Orbach posits that the MFFA is a key use of what he calls the “Commerce Battering 
Ram” to strengthen states’ rights.  Id. at 1164.  The “Commerce Battering Ram” is “a 
political-legal apparatus that private lawmakers design and employ to challenge current 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence” and primarily invokes the Tenth Amendment.  Id. 
 13 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 14 See infra Part II. 
 15 E.g., Lyle Dennison, Justice Kennedy and the “War on Drugs,” SCOTUSBLOG 
(June 6, 2005), http://www.scotusblog.com/2005/06/commentary-justice-kennedy-and-
the-war-on-drugs (suggesting that Justice Anthony M. Kennedy has a “zero tolerance 
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jurisprudence to acknowledge those concerns and to fill the gap left by 
the three Lopez categories, even if it is at “gunpoint.” 
Section II presents a historical review of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence in Commerce Clause cases as well as a showing of the 
confusion among the circuit courts in trying to apply Raich in federal sex 
offender registry law.16  In Section III, this Comment considers the 
MFFA, the motivation and goals of its supporters, and the current court 
challenges to the legislation.  Section IV identifies the products category 
of the Commerce Clause, suggesting a balancing test that requires 
consideration of four factors.  The balancing test takes into consideration 
scattered elements of federal courts’ previous analyses.  Section V 
considers the viability of the MFFA under this new regime and shows 
how the MFFA is likely to be insulated from regulation by the federal 
government.  It also examines other products to show that the category 
has always existed, but until now, has not been articulated. 
II. COMMERCE CLAUSE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. A Limited Congressional Power Grows 
In Gibbons v. Ogden,17 the first Commerce Clause case, the 
Supreme Court stated that “traffic” and “intercourse” that take place 
beyond state borders is within congressional jurisdiction.18  This power 
to regulate had inherent limitations because the “exclusively internal 
commerce of a State” is not an enumerated power of Congress.19  In the 
wake of the American Civil War, which was, at its core, a debate on 
states’ rights, the Reconstruction Amendments20 ushered in the theory 
that the federal government had responsibility for enforcing civil rights 
for all citizens.21  The Supreme Court’s decision in The Civil Rights 
                                                                                                             
point of view” when it comes to illegal drugs and that in Raich, Justice Kennedy 
abandoned his more consistent legal position of favoring state powers over an expanding 
role of the federal government). 
 16 See United States v. Dixon, 551 F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 2008) cert granted sub nom. 
Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 47 (2009). 
 17 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
 18 Id. at 189–95. 
 19 Id. at 194–95. 
 20 U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV. 
 21 Rebecca E. Zietlow, John Bingham and the Meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment: Congressional Enforcement of Civil Rights and John Bingham’s Theory of 
Citizenship, 36 AKRON L. REV. 717, 718 (2003) (“After the Civil War, the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Reconstruction era, civil rights statutes reflect the fact that the 
Thirty-ninth Congress adopted an expansive vision of the rights of federal citizens and 
that Congress embraced its role as protector of those rights.”). 
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Cases of 1883,22 however, was a major defeat for the Reconstruction 
Amendments and the federal legislation that Congressional Republicans 
passed to enforce the spirit of those constitutional changes. The Supreme 
Court struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875, and declined to extend 
the statute’s anti-discrimination and equal protection provisions to 
private actors, but rather extended the provisions only to the states.23  
The Court suggested, however, that federal discrimination laws could be 
sustained under the Commerce Clause.24  This planted the seed for 
federal anti-discrimination law in the next century.25 
The Court directly addressed Congress’s commerce power as the 
20th century approached.  The Lottery Case26 established that Congress 
could not use the Anti-Lottery Act of 1895 to outlaw all lottery tickets; 
rather, the act could only outlaw those that traveled in interstate 
commerce.  This holding was based on the proposition that it is within 
the federal government’s reach to regulate what “evils” are permitted on 
the channels of interstate commerce.27 
This same reasoning applied to the Court’s decisions in Hoke v. 
United States28 and Caminetti v. United States,29 which upheld the White 
Slave Traffic (Mann) Act30 as a constitutional use of the Commerce 
Clause to control what products or people are permitted in interstate 
channels.31  Congress had a well-defined, but limited, power over 
interstate commerce.  The Supreme Court, however, did not allow the 
                                                                                                             
 22 United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 23 Stanley, 109 U.S. at 18–20. 
 24 Id. at 18–19 (“Of course, these remarks do not apply to those cases in which 
Congress is clothed with direct and plenary powers of legislation over the whole subject, 
accompanied with an express or implied denial of such power to the States, as in the 
regulation of commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, and with the 
Indian tribes, the coining of money, the establishment of post offices and post reads, the 
declaring of war, etc.  In these cases Congress has power to pass laws for regulating the 
subjects specified in every detail, and the conduct and transactions of individuals in 
respect thereof . . . .  And whether Congress, in the exercise of its power to regulate 
commerce amongst the several States, might or might not pass a law regulating rights in 
public conveyances passing from one State to another, is also a question which is not now 
before us, as the sections in question are not conceived in any such view.”). 
 25 See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (“Thus the 
power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes the power to regulate 
the local incidents thereof, including local activities in both the States of origin and 
destination, which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce.”). 
 26 Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903). 
 27 Id. at 362. 
 28 227 U.S. 308 (1913). 
 29 242 U.S. 470 (1917). 
 30 White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (current version at 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2421–24 (2006)). 
 31 Id. 
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federal government to regulate the same “evils” that did not cross state 
lines. 
Until 1937, the Supreme Court had significantly curtailed the power 
of Congress to legislate under the Commerce Clause if the Court 
considered a law to have more local than interstate characteristics.32  
Early in Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency, the Court rebuffed Roosevelt’s 
“New Deal” agenda, finding his initiatives to be beyond the scope of 
congressional commerce power.33  But the Court eventually agreed with 
the administration and Congress in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp.34  The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) mandated that 
workers be permitted to unionize and participate in collective bargaining 
and that the NLRB could issue a complaint against any company 
operating with “unfair labor practices” that were “affecting commerce.”35  
The Court stated, “[a]lthough activities may be intrastate in character 
when separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial 
relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or 
appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, 
Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control.”36  
Armed with the newly-expanded reading of the Commerce Clause, 
Congress continued to pass laws invoking their commerce power for the 
next sixty years.37  This expansion did not go uncontested.  Ohio farmer 
Roscoe Filburn filed suit against the government after he was penalized 
for harvesting too much wheat pursuant to the statutory maximum in the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA).38  The AAA had a basis in 
rudimentary economics: the lesser the supply of wheat on the market, the 
higher the price would rise, which would, in turn, encourage wheat 
production. 39  In Wickard v. Filburn, Filburn argued that his excess 
wheat was for his own consumption, and so long as his product did not 
enter the national market, it could not directly affect interstate commerce 
and could not come under Congress’s commerce power.40 
                                                                                                             
 32 Gregory W. Watts, Note, Gonzales v. Raich: How to Fix a Mess of “Economic” 
Proportions, 40 AKRON L. REV. 545, 548 (2007). 
 33 See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 US 
238 (1936); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (The Hot Oil Case), 293 U.S. 388 (1935); R.R. 
Ret. Bd. v. Alton Ry. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 
295 U.S. 495 (1935); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935). 
 34 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 35 Id. at 22–25. 
 36 Id. at 37. 
 37 John M.A. DiPippa, The Death and Resurrection of RFRA: Integrating Lopez and 
Boerne, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 767, 781 n.95 (1998). 
 38 See Jim Chen, Filburn’s Legacy, 52 EMORY L.J. 1719, 1733–36 (2003). 
 39 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942). 
 40 Id. at 119–20. 
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The Supreme Court ruled that although Filburn’s individual 
consumption had little effect on interstate commerce, if farmers in 
aggregate acted in contravention of the statute, there would be a “far 
from trivial” effect on demand for wheat.41  The Court upheld the AAA 
and Congress’s absolute ability to control the market price of a 
commodity in interstate commerce.42  “Filburn is regarded today as the 
high-water mark of the New Deal’s constitutional revolution.”43 
B. A Confusing Modern Era 
Lopez v. United States proved to be the breaking point for 
commerce power expansion.  In 1992, a Texas high school student was 
indicted and charged with a violation of the Gun-Free School Zones Act 
of 1990 (GFSZA).44  This federal law made it a crime to possess a 
firearm in a school zone.45  The opinion in Lopez, written by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, announced that it would define the “outer limits” of 
Congress’s commerce power.46  The Rehnquist Court articulated three 
broad categories of activities that Congress has the ability to regulate.47 
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate 
commerce.  Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and 
protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or 
things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come 
only from intrastate activities.  Finally, Congress’ commerce 
authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a 
substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities 
that substantially affect interstate commerce.48 
The Court stated that the GFSZA would be evaluated under the 
substantially affects category.49  The GFSZA parted from statutes such as 
the AAA in that the latter related to an economic activity,50 whereas the 
GFSZA concerned criminal penalties.51  The Court explained that when 
                                                                                                             
 41 Id. 127–28. 
 42 Id. at 127–29. 
 43 Chen, supra note 38, at 1747.  See also, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 
(1995) (“Wickard . . . is perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause 
authority over intrastate activity. . . .”). 
 44 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. 
 45 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)(1)(A) (1988 ed., Supp. V). 
 46 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556–57. 
 47 Id. at 558. 
 48 Id. (citations omitted).  The three categories, in order, are hereinafter alternatively 
identified as the “channels category,” the “instrumentalities, persons, and things 
category,” and the “substantially affects category.”  Id. 
 49 Id. at 559. 
 50 Id. at 560. 
 51 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)(1)(A). 
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Congress follows the “pattern” of economic activity cases, the Court will 
uphold the statute.52  Therefore, the Supreme Court did not overrule 
Jones & Laughlin Steel or Wickard.53  The Court declared instead that 
the GFSZA did not relate to commerce or any type of economic activity, 
and also lacked any jurisdictional element that would tie the concern to 
interstate commerce.54  In response to Lopez, Congress amended  
§ 922(q) and included findings that guns in and around schools affect 
interstate commerce.55 
Lopez was affirmed in United States v. Morrison.56  The Supreme 
Court considered the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA),57 
which gave victims of gender-motivated violence a civil remedy against 
their attackers.58  Looking again at the substantially affects category, the 
Court discussed four “significant considerations” stated in Lopez.59  First, 
the GFSZA was a criminal statute and it did not relate to commerce or 
the economy.60  Second, the GFSZA had no jurisdictional element or 
“explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce.”61  Third, 
although not required, the statute contained no legislative history or 
congressional findings on how instate commerce was affected by guns in 
a school zone.62  Lastly, the Court did not see more than an attenuated 
link between the possession of a firearm in a school zone and interstate 
commerce.63 
With these four factors established, the Court found that VAWA 
satisfied only one factor, congressional findings, which the Court 
declared as insufficient to uphold the act under Congress’s commerce 
power.64  Furthermore, Congress came to these findings using reasoning 
                                                                                                             
 52 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560. 
 53 Chen, supra note 38, at 1751 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 602 (Thomas, J., 
concurring)). 
 54 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. 
 55 Id. at 563 n.4.  The amended statute has not come before the Supreme Court, but it 
has been upheld in the circuit courts.  See also Seth J. Safra, Note, The Amended Gun-
Free School Zones Act: Doubt as to Its Constitutionality Remains, 50 DUKE L.J. 637 
(2000). 
 56 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 57 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000). 
 58 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (2006) (“for the recovery of compensatory and punitive 
damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other relief as a court may deem 
appropriate.”). 
 59 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610. 
 60 Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561). 
 61 Id. at 611–12 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562). 
 62 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 614, 615. 
238 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 7:229 
that the Court denied in Lopez.65  The Court rejected VAWA as outside 
the scope of Congress’s power to regulate, given that violence against 
women is a noneconomic crime, even if it has an aggregate effect on 
interstate commerce.66  The Court further noted that it is a local activity, 
and that “[t]he Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly 
national and what is truly local.”67 
Gonzales v. Raich68 has replaced Lopez as the seminal commerce 
power case, which was a surprising turn.69  The Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) seized and destroyed cannabis plants grown by 
the respondents, who legally possessed them under the California 
Compassionate Use Act.  The Compassionate Use Act encouraged the 
affordable accessibility of marijuana to “seriously ill” patients and called 
for exceptions for doctors, caretakers, and other individuals to prescribe, 
cultivate, and possess marijuana.70  In order to justify seizure of the 
plants, the DEA invoked the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), which 
makes possessing, obtaining, or manufacturing marijuana a federal 
crime.71  Respondents sued for relief from the enforcement of the CSA, 
arguing that it violated the Commerce Clause.72  Justice Stevens, writing 
for the majority, found the CSA to be constitutional.73  The Court recited 
the history of the CSA and called the law a “comprehensive statute,” 
which Congress passed to halt or control the international and interstate 
trade of illicit drugs and controlled substances.74 
The Court compared the “striking” similarities of the CSA and the 
statute reviewed in Wickard, the AAA, finding that both regulated the 
supply and demand of fungible commodities that Congress had a rational 
basis to believe would affect interstate commerce.75  In order to 
accomplish the goal of limiting the use and trade in controlled illicit 
substances, Congress enacted the CSA, which the Court deemed 
                                                                                                             
 65 Id. at 615. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 617–18. 
 68 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 69 See Tara M. Stuckey, Note, Jurisdictional Hooks in the Wake of Raich: On 
Properly Interpreting Federal Regulations of Interstate Commerce, 81 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 2101, 2103 (2006).  “[T]he Raich principle is somewhat surprising in light of the 
‘new federalism’ era marked by Lopez and Morrison.” (alterations added). 
 70 Raich, 545 U.S. at 6–8. 
 71 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2006). 
 72 Raich, 545 U.S. at 7–8.  Respondents also claimed the enforcement of the CSA 
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments, and the doctrine of medical necessity.  Id. 
 73 Id. at 9. 
 74 Id. at 10–15. 
 75 Id. at 17–22. 
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“necessary and proper” to combat enforcement problems.76  The Court 
further noted, “[t]hat the regulation ensnares some purely intrastate 
activity is of no moment.”77  The Court also distinguished the CSA as a 
complex regulatory scheme and not a single-subject statute, in contrast to 
the GFSZA.78  The complexity of the CSA supported the government’s 
proposition that the restriction on marijuana could not be specifically 
exempted.79 
In rejecting the respondents’ claim that the Morrison decision 
applied, the Court explained that neither VAWA nor the GFSZA 
regulated economic activity.80  In contrast, the Court labeled the 
provisions of the CSA “quintessentially economic,” and defined 
“economics” as “the production, distribution, and consumption of 
commodities.”81  The Court noted, “[p]rohibiting the intrastate 
possession or manufacture of an article of commerce is a rational (and 
commonly utilized) means of regulating commerce in that product.”82  
The concept of supply and demand is such a basic concept that Congress 
had the right to control commerce in the way the CSA permitted.83 
The Court also rejected the claim that the California medicinal 
marijuana supply could be cut off from the national supply.84  First, the 
Court noted that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution85 settles all 
conflicts in law in favor of the federal government.86  Second, the Court 
recognized that “unscrupulous people” would have no issue in using the 
California law to their devious advantage and would therefore be able to 
move marijuana into the national marketplace.87  The Court fully 
supported the CSA as falling within the bounds of Congress’s commerce 
power. 
                                                                                                             
 76 Id. at 22 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8). 
 77 Id. at 22. 
 78 Raich, 545 U.S. at 23–24. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 25. 
 81 Id. at 25–26 (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 (3d ed. 
1966)). 
 82 Id. at 26. 
 83 Id. at 28–29. 
 84 Raich, 545 U.S. at 29–32. 
 85 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of 
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 86 Raich, 545 U.S. at 29. 
 87 Id. at 31–32. 
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C. Scarborough: The Outlier Within 
Scarborough v. United States88 is mentioned only once in the 
Lopez-Morrison-Raich line of cases, in dissent,89 but the case is relevant 
to Commerce Clause jurisprudence when dealing with the regulation of 
an intrastate product. Scarborough was convicted under the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 for being a convicted felon 
“who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting 
commerce . . . any firearm . . . .”90  The defendant had been convicted of 
a narcotics felony in 1972, and in 1973, law enforcement executed a 
search warrant and found four firearms in his bedroom.91  He was 
charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1202.92  The government argued 
that it need only prove that the weapons in his possession had traveled in 
interstate commerce at some point,93 and the Supreme Court agreed, 
ending a circuit split on the matter.94  After a discussion of statutory 
construction and the legislative record, the Court concluded that 
Congress intended no more than a “minimal nexus” between the firearm 
and interstate commerce, meaning that the statute reached any firearm 
that traveled in interstate commerce at any time.95  But the Court did not 
say that this conviction could be upheld absent the interstate travel of the 
firearm.  In wording that foreshadowed the “regulatory scheme” 
language of Raich, the Court held that the defendant’s theory that the 
nexus between the possession of firearms and interstate commerce was 
too attenuated would “create serious loopholes in the congressional plan 
to ‘make it unlawful for a firearm . . . to be in the possession of a 
convicted felon.’”96  Scarborough is noteworthy because it was not 
overruled following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Lopez and 
Morrison, and thus, remains good law.97 
D. Federal Sex Offender Registries 
One area that has yielded significant case law in post-Raich 
jurisprudence, but has failed to contribute to further clarity of Raich, is 
federal registration for sex offenders.  The Sex Offender Registration and 
                                                                                                             
 88 431 U.S. 563 (1977). 
 89 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.598, 658 (2000). 
 90 Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 564. 
 91 Id. at 564–65. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 565. 
 94 Id. at 566–67. 
 95 Id. at 567–75. 
 96 Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 575–76 (internal citations omitted). 
 97 Justice Rehnquist did not participate in the consideration or decision of 
Scarborough. 
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Notification Act (SORNA), part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection 
and Safety Act of 2006, (the “Walsh Act”),98 requires sex offenders to 
register in the jurisdiction or jurisdictions in which they reside, work, or 
attend school.99  The federal law establishes the registration requirements 
and dictates how long offenders must remain registered based on the 
level of their offense.100  As a condition of some federal law enforcement 
funding, states must have a registry that complies with federal 
standards.101  A National Sex Offender Registry is maintained by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation.102 
Nearly every challenge to SORNA on Commerce Clause grounds 
in the circuit courts has favored the federal government, but the way in 
which the courts have reached that conclusion has differed.103  Although 
there is not a true circuit split in the final decisions in these cases, as they 
have all found SORNA constitutional under the Commerce Clause, the 
categorization of SORNA under the three Lopez categories has varied.104  
                                                                                                             
 98 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–16929 (2006). 
 99 United States v. Myers, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1315 (S.D. Fla. 2008); 42 U.S.C.  
§ 16913 (2006). 
 100 42 U.S.C. § 16915 (2006).  Tier I offenders must remain registered for 15 years; 
Tier II offenders must remain registered for 25 years; and Tier III offenders must remain 
registered for life.  Offenders may be able to lower their required registration time based 
on a clean record.  Id. 
 101 42 U.S.C. § 14071(g)(2) (2006).  Even if there is a Spending Power issue involved, 
it would not reach the issue of a federal statute being used to enforce a state registry, even 
if it was required by the federal government.  Id. 
 102 42 U.S.C. § 16919(a) (2006). 
 103 The Eighth Circuit in United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2008) and 
United States v. Howell, 552 F.3d 709 (2009) and the Ninth Circuit in United States v. 
George, 579 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2009) held that SORNA is permitted under the first two 
categories of Lopez.  The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Whaley, 577 F.3d 254 (2009) 
determined that the penalty provision is covered under the “channels of commerce” 
category of Lopez and that the registration requirement falls into the substantially affects 
category.  The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Lawrance, 548 F.3d 1329 (10th Cir. 
2008) and United States v. Hinckley, 550 F.3d 926 (10th Cir. 2008) and the Eleventh 
Circuit in United States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2009) placed both provisions 
of SORNA into the “channels of commerce” category, or alternatively, the 
“instrumentalities, persons, and things” category, explaining that the movement of sex 
offenders is akin to the movement of people for “immoral purposes” as a permitted 
regulation in Caminetti.  The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459 (4th 
Cir. 2009) found that § 2250 of SORNA implicated the first two Lopez categories, and 
that § 16913 was supported by the regulatory scheme of the Walsh Act, for which the 
court cited extensive congressional findings on the effects that sex offenders traveling 
interstate would have on interstate commerce.  The Second Circuit in United States v. 
Guzman, 591 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2010) found that § 2250 is permissible under the first and 
second Lopez categories, as it would not otherwise reach intrastate sex offenders, and that 
although § 16913 “is more difficult” to determine, it is part of the Walsh Act’s larger 
regulatory scheme that can be regulated under the Necessary and Proper Clause powers 
of Congress. 
 104 See supra note 103.  
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It appears, however, that the extensive circuit court work in this area is 
moot because the Supreme Court has avoided the Commerce Clause 
argument in these cases altogether.105 
Despite the buildup at the circuit court level, the Supreme Court’s 
decisions regarding SORNA prove that it was not meant to be a 
watershed commerce clause statute.  In Carr v. United States,106 the 
Supreme Court determined that an individual who committed an 
underlying sexual offense and traveled in interstate commerce prior to 
SORNA’s enactment cannot be prosecuted under § 2250.107  It is likely 
not a coincidence that Carr, on appeal from the Seventh Circuit’s case 
United States v. Dixon, was the case that the Court chose to review.  The 
Seventh Circuit did not discuss the Commerce Clause implications of 
SORNA, and the Supreme Court’s final decision reflected that.108  By 
avoiding the Commerce Clause issues of SORNA, the Supreme Court 
has done nothing to settle the inconsistencies that exist in the 
jurisprudence. 
III. THE MONTANA FIREARMS FREEDOM ACT 
A. Statutory History 
The Montana Firearms Freedom Act was signed by Governor Brian 
D. Schweitzer and became effective on October 1, 2009, signaling the 
start of the controversy.109  According to the MFFA, the Ninth110 and 
Tenth Amendments111 to the Constitution preclude federal regulation of 
purely intrastate manufacture of firearms, firearms accessories, and 
ammunition.112  The MFFA invokes the Second Amendment, “as that 
right was understood at the time that Montana was admitted to 
statehood,” as a contractual bond with the federal government and the 
state and people of Montana.113  The MFFA deems specific firearms 
                                                                                                             
 105 Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229 (2010).  But see Corey Rayburn Yung, When 
is a Circuit Agreement Really a Circuit Split?, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Mar. 10, 2009) 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/03/when_is_circuit.html (arguing that 
there is actually a circuit split disguised as an agreement). 
 106 130 S. Ct. 2229 (2010). 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id.  Instead, the ruling was based on statutory interpretation.  Id. 
 109 Montana Firearms Freedom Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-20-101–106 (2010). 
 110 U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”). 
 111 U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or 
to the people.”). 
 112 MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-20-102 (2010). 
 113 Id. 
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exclusively intrastate, and thus not subject to any federal regulations. The 
firearms that fall within the ambit of the statute are those with all of their 
major parts, accessories, and ammunition manufactured in the state and 
that have received a special permit requiring them to remain in 
Montana.114  The legislature also declares that small, insignificant parts 
and raw materials that may move in interstate commerce do not subject 
the finished product to federal regulation.115  To market the firearm in 
Montana, the weapon must have “Made in Montana” stamped on a major 
metallic part.116  The MFFA also states that the statute will not protect 
firearms that require more than one person to carry, firearms that have a 
larger bore diameter and smokeless powder, ammunition that has an 
exploding projectile using chemical energy, or automatic weapons.117 
The actual effect of the legislation on the production of firearms in 
Montana is unclear.  There are only eight firearms manufacturers in 
Montana,118 but business has been booming due to high demand.119  
Whether that demand or the legislation increases the amount of in-state 
manufacturers remains to be seen.  At present, all individuals and 
companies that manufacture firearms and ammunition, as well as those 
who conduct interstate and intrastate sales, are required to have a federal 
license and follow all federal regulations.120  Therefore, the MFFA 
presents a significant divergence with the current law. 
B. Federal Firearms Statutes 
The MFFA targets federal firearms statutes. The 1934 National 
Firearms Act (NFA) imposed taxes on the manufacture and sale of 
firearms,121 and also provided for registration.122  The Gun Control Act of 
1968 (GCA)123 intended to assist the states in regulating and controlling 
the marketplace for firearms in order to enforce the states’ own gun 
                                                                                                             
 114 Id. at § 30-20-104.  
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at § 30-20-106. 
 117 Id. at § 30-20-105. 
 118 Montana Firearms Manufacturers and Gunsmiths, MONTANA SHOOTING SPORTS 
ASSOCIATION, http://www.mtssa.org/mt.phtml (last visited Dec. 20, 2010). 
 119 Myers Reece, Surrounded by Job Losses, Montana’s Firearms Industry Thrives, 
FLATHEAD BEACON (Oct. 30, 2009) (available at http://www.newwest.net/city/article/ 
surrounded_by_job_losses_montanas_firearms_industry_thrives/C8/L8) (“And [in 2009,] 
prompted by concern over how the Obama administration will affect federal gun laws, 
business has gone through the roof.”). 
 120 18 U.S.C. § 923 (2006). 
 121 26 U.S.C. §§ 5811–22 (2006). 
 122 Id. at§ 5841. 
 123 18 U.S.C. §§ 921 (2006). 
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control laws and help slow serious crime.124  The GCA also established a 
list of prohibited acts,125 licensing,126 penalties,127 and concealed carry 
regulations,128 among many other requirements.129  The federal Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (BATFE) has the authority 
to investigate violations of the NFA and the GCA.130 
Federal firearms laws state that no one may be in “the business of 
importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, or importing or 
manufacturing firearms ammunition” until they obtain a Federal 
Firearms License (FFL).131  FFL holders can “ship, transport, or receive 
any firearm in interstate or foreign commerce.”132  FFL holders must also 
maintain records for any business they conduct,133 though the types of 
records differ depending on the type of license, i.e., manufacturing 
versus importing.134  One such record is the Firearms Transaction 
Record, BATF Form 4473, which FFL holders must complete.135  FFL 
holders must verify the recipient’s identity and conduct a background 
check with the National Instant Criminal Background Check System.136  
The GCA also requires that every firearm imported or manufactured 
have a serial number permanently on the receiver or frame of the 
firearm.137 
C. The MFFA in Federal Court 
When the MFFA went into effect on October 1, 2009, proponents 
filed suit in federal court, seeking a declaration that the MFFA and the 
activities that it authorizes are permissible notwithstanding current 
                                                                                                             
 124 S. Rep. No. 1866, 89th Cong., 2s Sess. 1 (1966).  The three goals of the legislation 
were to “(1) regulate more effectively interstate commerce in firearms so as to reduce the 
likelihood that they fall into the hands of the lawless or those who might misuse them; (2) 
assist the States and their political subdivisions to enforce their firearms control laws and 
ordinances; and (3) help combat the skyrocketing increases in the incidence of serious 
crime in the United States.”  Id. 
 125 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2006). 
 126 Id. at § 923. 
 127 Id. at § 924. 
 128 Id. at § 926A–936C. 
 129 Id. at §§ 921–931. 
 130 28 U.S.C. § 599A (2006). 
 131 18 U.S.C. § 923 (2006). 
 132 Id. at § 922(a)(1)(A). 
 133 Id. at § 923(g)(1)(A). 
 134 27 C.F.R. §§ 478.121–25. 
 135 18 U.S.C. § 922(t) (2006); 27 C.F.R. §§ 478.102, 478.124.  The statute is also 
known as BATF Form 4473.  27 C.F.R. §§ 478.102, 478.124.   
 136 18 U.S.C. § 922(t); 27 C.F.R. §§ 478.102, 478.124. 
 137 18 U.S.C. § 923(i) (2006). 
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federal laws.138  The Montana Shooting Sports Association (MSSA), 
along with its president Gary Marbut139 and the Second Amendment 
Foundation (SAF) filed the complaint, which seeks to enjoin the federal 
government from prosecuting Montana citizens for following the 
MFFA.140  The plaintiffs have expressed their wishes to manufacture and 
sell firearms and ammunition within the state without federal 
registration.141  Marbut inquired directly to BATFE regarding the issue 
and the agency told Marbut that he was required to register with them.142 
The findings and recommendations by the magistrate judge,143 
which were later accepted in full by the district court,144 make it clear 
that the two sides are arguing very different cases.  The MSSA argued 
that the Constitution does not give Congress the power to regulate the 
contemplated actions by Marbut, and that the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments should permit this intrastate regulation.145  The MSSA also 
disputed the federal government’s argument that the Supremacy Clause 
superseded any state claims in the area of firearms regulation.146 
This argument regarding the Ninth and Tenth Amendments may 
very well be colorable, but that analysis is beyond the scope of this 
Comment.147  Some consider the Tenth Amendment an important part of 
“New Federalism,”148 while others give it no more importance than “a 
                                                                                                             
 138 Mont. Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder (“MSSA”), CV-09-147-M-DWM-JCL, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104301 (D. Mont. Aug. 31, 2010). 
 139 Officers, MONTANA SHOOTING SPORTS ASSOCIATION, http://www.mtssa.org/ 
officers.phtml (last visited Dec. 20, 2010); Declan McCullagh, “Gun-Rights Groups Plan 
State-by-State Revolt,” Political Hotsheet, CBS NEWS, (June 16, 2009) available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2009/06/16/politics/politicalhotsheet/ 
entry5090952.shtml. 
 140 Id. 3–4; 8–10. 
 141 Id. 5–6. 
 142 Id. 13–14. 
 143 Mont. Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder (“MSSA”), CV-09-147-M-DWM-JCL, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104301 (D. Mont. Aug. 31, 2010). 
 144 Mont. Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, CV-09-147-M-DWM-JCL, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 110891 (D. Mont. Oct. 18, 2010). 
 145 MSSA, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104301, at *9. 
 146 Id. 
 147 The premise of this Comment is that there may be an easier route through a better-
articulated categorization of the ways in which Congress can or cannot regulate based on 
the Commerce Clause power.  As will be discussed, infra, the United States argues that 
the federal government’s power in this area derives from the Commerce Clause, and my 
prediction is that this is the course that this suit, and others like it, will follow.  Though 
the Tenth Amendment argument may be a more popular, and populist, way of attacking 
the issue, as has been done in the news media, the MFFA would need to defeat a 
Commerce Clause claim first.  See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992); 
Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 867 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 148 Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in 
the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503 (2007). 
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truism with attitude.”149  It is more appropriate to consider the validity of 
the MFFA under the Commerce Clause directly.150 
After rejecting the MSSA’s claim on both sovereign immunity151 
and standing,152 the magistrate judge addressed the Commerce Clause 
issues.  The court cited Raich and pointed out that “even purely local 
activities” can be regulated by Congress when the activity falls under the 
third Lopez category, as is the case with the MFFA.153  At the heart of the 
ruling was a comparison between the CSA in Raich and the NFA and 
GCA.154 The court refused to distinguish Raich from the case at bar.155  
The court also looked to United States v. Stewart (Stewart II),156 the 
relevant Ninth Circuit precedent, to lend support to its findings and 
recommendations.157  The MSSA has filed for an appeal before the Ninth 
Circuit.158 
IV. IDENTIFYING THE PRODUCTS CATEGORY 
A. The Need for an Articulated Fourth Category For Products 
The substantially affects category of Lopez is over-inclusive and 
must be narrowed in order to reach more coherent and consistent results. 
Statutes such as VAWA, which the Supreme Court analyzed in 
Morrison, and the NLRA, permitted under Jones & Laughlin Steel, 
should continue to occupy this category.  This “broad” category remains 
relevant and coherent for intangibles, or as the Supreme Court has 
characterized them, activities.159  VAWA included no aspect of 
economics,160 but rather concerned the implementation of a civil remedy 
for a violent crime.161  Yet the four factors of Morrison have applied too 
broadly to cases involving products, both in interstate and intrastate 
                                                                                                             
 149 Gary Lawson, A Truism with Attitude: The Tenth Amendment in Constitutional 
Context, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 469 (2008). 
 150 See McCullagh, supra note 139. 
 151 Mont. Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, No. CV-09-147-DWM-JCL, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 104301, *15–29 (D. Mont. Aug. 31, 2010). 
 152 Id. at *29–46. 
 153 Id. at *49. 
 154 Id. at *49–53. 
 155 Id. at *58–70. 
 156 451 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 157 MSSA, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104301, at *53–56.  A more detailed review of 
Stewart II follows infra Parts VI and V. 
 158 Notice of Appeal, Mont. Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, No. CV-09-147-M-
DWM-JCL (D. Mont. Filed Dec. 2, 2010). 
 159 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995). 
 160 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (“Gender-motivated crimes of 
violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity”). 
 161 Id. at 601. 
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commerce.  The Court’s decision in Lopez to place anything that is not 
the use of a channel of interstate commerce or is not an instrumentality, 
person, or thing in interstate commerce into this amorphous third 
category of “activity” created several problems.  This broad language 
gives lower courts no substantial guidance, as almost anything can be 
considered part of a larger activity and therefore may be regulated by 
Congress. 
The analysis of what activities are covered under Congress’s 
commerce power is also muddled by different judicial preferences 
regarding these varied policy goals of the regulations in question.  In his 
concurrence in Raich, Justice Scalia considered his change of position 
from his decisions in Lopez and Morrison not a reversal, but rather part 
of a “nuanced” view of the Commerce Clause powers vested in the 
federal government.162  Justice Scalia relied heavily on the Necessary and 
Proper Clause of the Constitution163 as a supplement to the Commerce 
Clause power. Others have seen Justice Scalia’s concurrence as his 
justification for accomplishing a conservative policy goal.164  “Unlike in 
Lopez and Morrison, which involved gun possession and violence 
against women—two issues that [Justice] Scalia arguably did not want to 
see nationalized—[Justice] Scalia saw a need for federal involvement in 
regulating the availability of marijuana.”165 
Confusion also arises because Scarborough has not been given its 
proper place in Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  Although Lopez struck 
down a related gun law, § 922(g) is still valid despite there being a 
minimal nexus between gun possession and interstate commerce.166  
                                                                                                             
 162 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005). 
 163 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing 
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”). 
 164 JAMES B. STAAB, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 271 
(2006).  Staab characterized this as a more balanced approach to federalism that Justice 
Scalia adopted beginning in the 1990s that shifted him from a “Hamiltonian” to a 
“Madisonian.”  Staab also considers the political reasons that Justice Scalia may have 
used “Hamiltonian means . . . to accomplish conservative goals.”  Id.  This theory falls 
short, however, when one considers Justice Scalia’s opinion in Kyllo v. United States, 
533 U.S. 27, 34–36, in which Scalia found that there was an “unreasonable” search, in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, when law enforcement’s use of thermal imaging to 
find halide lights used to grow marijuana indoors. 
 165 Id.  Justice Scalia was also skeptical of the premise of the suit and Raich’s goals in 
the first place.  Id.  “Scalia did not likely approve of marijuana being described as 
medical treatment, and was concerned about the Compassionate Use Act being misused 
and marijuana becoming more prevalent in interstate commerce.”  Id. 
 166 Brent E. Newton, Felons, Firearms, and Federalism: Reconsidering Scarborough 
in Light of Lopez, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 671, 676–77 (2001). 
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Some circuits have argued that logically, the concept of an interstate 
nexus noted in Scarborough could not survive Lopez, but none of these 
courts overruled the 1977 decision.167  Scarborough has been criticized 
for creating the “legal fiction” that no matter how remote a gun’s 
connection to interstate commerce may be, even if in the past, it could be 
considered to be “in” commerce.168  Raich permitted Congress’s reach 
into intrastate possession because the object regulated was subject to a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme.  Scarborough addresses nothing 
about markets or any commercially related activity whatsoever.  In terms 
of the Commerce Clause framework, the possession of guns in 
Scarborough has no home in any Lopez category, yet it has not been 
overturned in the face of these conflicts. 
This amorphous substantially affects category has led to wheat 
farmers, child pornographers, gun-toting felons, medicinal marijuana 
growers, and labor unions all being regulated under the same 
constitutional principle.  For cases in which a product that remains in 
intrastate commerce is the concern, a fourth category is appropriate.169  
But, in case after case, the Court has been unable to divorce itself from 
the Lopez framework and has indiscriminately dropped every irregular 
issue into the third category as an “activity.” 
Raich operated under this flaw, using “activity” to mean “product,” 
as if the terms are interchangeable.  The Court in Raich said, “Wickard 
thus establishes that Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that 
is not itself ‘commercial’ in that it is not produced for sale, if it 
concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the 
regulation of the interstate market in that commodity.”170  A “purely 
intrastate activity” cannot be “produced for sale.”  Consider the root 
word: a product is what is produced. The “evil” that Congress wants to 
regulate is not that Filburn farmed, generally.  Had Filburn planted 
excessive acreage that yielded no wheat he would not have faced fines 
under the AAA.  His activity of growing is not the problem: his product, 
wheat, is. 
                                                                                                             
 167 Id. 
 168 United States v. Coward, 151 F. Supp. 2d 544, 549 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (“This fiction 
is indelible and lasts as long as the gun can shoot.  Thus, a felon who has always kept his 
father’s World War II trophy Luger in his bedroom has the weapon ‘in’ commerce.”). 
 169 For another reason to create a fourth category under the Lopez framework, see 
Ryan K. Stumphauzer, Note, Electronic Impulses, Digital Signals, and Federal 
Jurisdiction: Congress’s Commerce Clause Power in the Twenty-First Century, 56 
VAND. L. REV. 277, 320 (2003) (suggesting that a fourth category is necessary to analyze 
the federal regulation of interstate communication devices). 
 170 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 18 (2005). 
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Herein lies the flaw of Wickard and Raich. Both of the statutes in 
question regulate products and their markets.  Even if the product is 
never sold, the economic laws of supply and demand justify the 
congressional prerogative if the goal of the legislation is to control the 
national market.171  Yet, that economic-based regulation is not always the 
purpose of congressional action.  The fourth category of products would 
establish a test to determine if Congress can regulate an intrastate 
product. 
The circuit courts have been unable to avoid this confusion. In 
United States v. Patton,172 the Tenth Circuit recognized that although 
“[i]t may seem like common sense to prohibit felons’ possession of 
bulletproof vests and other forms of body armor,” it does not necessarily 
mean that Congress has the power to regulate that possession.173  The 
Tenth Circuit’s dilemma is that it had to decide whether to make the 
decision based on the three categories of Lopez or to utilize the 
Scarborough standard.174  The bulletproof vest in question in Patton was 
manufactured in another state but was possessed by the defendant only in 
Kansas.175  Patton was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 931, which 
prohibits the “purchase, ownership, or possession of body armor by 
violent felons.”176 
The court dismissed the channels category and the 
instrumentalities, people, and things category as sources for 
congressional authority.177  In order to evaluate the substantially affects 
category, the court employed its own four-factor test outlined in United 
States v. Grimmett.178  The Tenth Circuit explained that to decide if 
Congress had a rational basis for believing the activity taken in aggregate 
would substantially affect interstate commerce, the court must consider 
whether: 
(1) the activity at which the statute is directed is commercial or 
economic in nature; (2) the statute contains an express 
jurisdictional element involving interstate activity that might 
limit its reach; (3) Congress has made specific findings regarding 
                                                                                                             
 171 Whether or not this is a sound economic policy is an issue for another day. 
Precedent allows for such a prerogative. 
 172 451 F.3d 615 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 173 Id. at 618 (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 426 (1821) 
(Marshall, C.J.) (“Congress has . . . no general right to punish murder committed within 
any of the States.”)). 
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 175 Id. at 619–20. 
 176 18 U.S.C. § 931 (2006). 
 177 Patton, 451 F.3d at 620–22. 
 178 439 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 2006). 
250 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 7:229 
the effects of the prohibited activity on interstate commerce; and 
(4) the link between the prohibited conduct and a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce is attenuated.179 
First, the court found that the possession of body armor is not 
commercial.180  Second, the Tenth Circuit posited that this law regulated 
only specific possession, not the market itself, as required by Raich.181  
The court also found that the government’s argument that there was a 
link between crime and an effect on interstate commerce was 
insufficient, akin to a mythical butterfly effect.182  Similar arguments had 
already been rejected in Lopez and Morrison.183  Third, the Tenth Circuit 
recognized that Congress mentioned the national market for body armor, 
but also noted that the statute did nothing to limit that market in any 
way.184  Despite findings to the contrary, the majority of states already 
regulate the possession and use of body armor, so the federal regulations 
may not even be necessary, and may actually impede upon the states’ 
local police powers, which they traditionally control.185  Fourth, the 
definition of body armor in federal law was overbroad in that almost all 
body armor would be regulated by it.186  Congress did not give reasons as 
to why body armor that travels in interstate commerce and does not fall 
into the possession of a felon should not be regulated, making it difficult 
to find if that particular activity substantially affected interstate 
commerce.187  The court thus found § 931 unconstitutional under this 
framework.188 
The Tenth Circuit then cautiously returned to Scarborough.  The 
court cited over a dozen opinions, in several circuits, in which the 
validity of Scarborough was questioned in light of the current line of 
commerce power cases.189  The court completely discounted the 
regulatory scheme and other standards in Raich in reaching the 
conclusion that § 931 is a constitutional use of Congress’s commerce 
power. 
                                                                                                             
 179 Id. at 1272. 
 180 Patton, 451 F.3d at 625. 
 181 Id. at 626–28. 
 182 Id. at 628–29. 
 183 Id.  
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The Tenth Circuit explicitly stated that there is “considerable 
tension between Scarborough and the three-category approach,” but 
“[a]ny doctrinal inconsistency between Scarborough and the Supreme 
Court’s more recent decisions is not for this Court to remedy.”190  
Though the circuits may not technically be split on some of these 
matters, it is clear that they are, at best, pleading for clarification, and at 
worst, challenging the Supreme Court to settle these divergent paths of 
Commerce Clause analysis. 
B. The Four Factor Test 
The circuit courts have come to their conclusions on the regulation 
of products in intrastate commerce based on disparate reasoning.  Using 
four common and powerful determinative factors, a balancing test 
emerges.  These factors should be weighed against one another to 
address the validity of these regulations. 
1. Does the Constitution Grant the Product Special Treatment? 
There are few amendments that invoke power over particular 
items.191  The First Amendment orders that government may not engage 
in “abridging the freedom of speech.”192  By outlawing certain articles, 
photos, or other tangible objects, Congress may be in violation of the 
First Amendment.  The Supreme Court has used this premise as an 
example in other Commerce Clause cases: “[U]nder the Commerce 
Clause Congress may regulate publishers engaged in interstate 
commerce, but Congress is constrained in the exercise of that power by 
the First Amendment.”193  Therefore, it is important to recognize which 
products the First Amendment protects in order to determine the scope of 
Congress’s authority to regulate. 
                                                                                                             
 190 Patton, 451 F.3d at 636 (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997)). 
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 192 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA) 
criminalizes the receipt, transportation, and possession of child 
pornography.194  Some pre-Raich cases ruled that the CPPA was an 
unconstitutional exercise of congressional commerce power.195  The 
Eleventh Circuit reheard United States v. Maxwell196 on remand from the 
Supreme Court and concluded that the Raich decision could serve as an 
outline opinion by merely substituting the CPPA for the CSA.197 
The Eleventh Circuit also reconsidered the CPPA in United States 
v. Smith (Smith II).198  Defendant Alvin Smith was originally found 
guilty of violating the CPPA199 for the production and possession of child 
pornography.200  Smith’s conviction was overturned on appeal before the 
Eleventh Circuit because the interstate commerce nexus was not 
considered sufficient to uphold the criminal statute under the Commerce 
Clause.201  Yet Smith II, even with the Raich analysis, also addressed a 
First Amendment argument.202  Smith took issue with the statutory 
construction of the CPPA, specifically the “knowingly” requirement.203  
The Eleventh Circuit considered the implications of the defendant’s 
knowledge of the age of those depicted in the pornography, as the 
material could be constitutionally protected if it involved only adults.204  
The court refers to the seminal cases on obscenity and child 
pornography, notably New York v. Ferber,205 in which the Supreme 
Court determined that the First Amendment did not protect child 
pornography.206  In this brief discussion, the Eleventh Circuit invoked a 
                                                                                                             
 194 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (2006). 
 195 See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell (Maxwell I), 386 F.3d 1042 (11th Cir. 2004) 
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U.S. 234, 240 (2002) (“As a general rule, pornography can be banned only if obscene, but 
under [New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982)] pornography showing minors can be 
proscribed whether or not the images are obscene under the definition set forth in Miller 
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factor that is not normally considered in most Commerce Clause cases, 
nor required in Lopez, Morrison, or Raich.  Because a Constitutional 
protection of a product is so rare, it is an important factor that has 
weighed heavily in courts’ analysis. 
2. Is the Regulation a Comprehensive Regulatory Scheme? 
The second factor federal courts should consider is whether there is 
a comprehensive regulatory scheme for the product in question.  This 
factor has been prominent in many cases due to the importance the 
Supreme Court gave it in Raich.207  The premise of this inquiry is 
somewhat dubious: length and detail in statutory language does not 
automatically make a “comprehensive” law.208  “Comprehensive” is 
defined as “covering completely or broadly.”209  The use of this word in 
the Court’s analysis seems particularly troubling for the purposes of 
determining if Congress has overstepped its boundaries.  That irony 
aside, the subjectivity of the determination is also a cause for confusion.  
The Fourth Circuit, in the decision that preceded Morrison, called 
VAWA a “comprehensive federal statute.”210 
The Supreme Court did not reject, nor even consider, the 
comprehensiveness of the statute when declaring VAWA 
unconstitutional.  As a result of Raich, such analysis is required.211  In 
Raich, the Court explained that Congress’s goal of halting drug abuse 
and controlling legal and illegal drug traffic was meant to be 
accomplished under the CSA, as the CSA created “a closed regulatory 
system making it unlawful to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or 
possess any controlled substance except in a manner authorized by the 
CSA.”212 
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The importance of defining and identifying a comprehensive 
regulatory scheme cannot be overstated.  Prior to Raich, jurisdictional 
hooks served the purpose of tying a federal regulation into interstate 
commerce in order to defend the constitutionality of the commerce 
power exercised.213  Following Lopez and Morrison, the jurisdictional 
hook was an important tool to find not only a nexus to interstate 
commerce, but also to limit the power of Congress by restricting the 
regulation only to those activities that are actually part of interstate 
commerce.214  But the result of Maxwell II215 is a prime example of how 
Raich’s comprehensive regulatory scheme framework has altered the 
landscape.  The Eleventh Circuit determined that jurisdictional 
sufficiency could be ignored when an activity falls under Raich.216  With 
jurisdictional hooks no longer playing a part in Commerce Clause 
decisions, the comprehensive regulatory scheme is the most concrete 
limitation that came out of Raich. 
The circuit courts have taken up the comprehensive regulatory 
scheme factor as part of their consideration in a number of Commerce 
Clause cases.  The Tenth Circuit reviewed this factor in Patton and found 
that Raich placed the CSA into the third category of Lopez because it 
presented a comprehensive regulatory scheme.217  The court’s discussion 
on the comprehensive regulatory scheme revolved around the effect that 
mere possession of a product has on the marketplace.218  The Patton 
court noted that Congress had not opted to make the manufacture, 
distribution, sale, possession, or use of the product, body armor, illegal, 
but instead only targeted possession for a specific group.219  This was not 
a proper use of the commerce power to regulate a market.220  The Tenth 
Circuit set a limit that regulation of a product that is not comprehensive 
is not sufficient to bring the regulation within the commerce power, as 
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even the federal regulation in Lopez was not enough to uphold the 
GFSZA. 
In 2006, following Raich, the Ninth Circuit reheard United States v. 
Stewart (Stewart II)221 and made significant changes in its analysis as to 
what constituted a regulatory scheme.  Stewart was in possession of five 
homemade machineguns which he constructed from unique and legal 
parts.222  In Stewart I, the focus on the federal regulation for possession 
of a machinegun, in violation of the GCA,223 relied on the economic and 
commercial nature of the regulation, defined by both the actual text of 
the statute as well as the congressional findings.224  The focus shifted in 
Stewart II because of Raich’s specific articulation of the role that the 
regulatory scheme must play in a Commerce Clause analysis.225  The 
court compared the CSA to the GCA, finding that both set different 
controls based on the uses of each class of drugs or firearms, 
respectively.226  The Stewart II court found that Raich allows Congress to 
ban the possession of a product where there is a comprehensive 
regulation and a rational basis for believing the product will affect the 
interstate market of that product.227  Congress is granted deference for all 
instances where a comprehensive regulatory scheme is in place.228 
3. Is the Product a Fungible Commodity? 
Determining whether a product is fungible,229 a commodity,230 or a 
fungible commodity is key to the analysis of whether Congress had 
sufficient commerce power to regulate a certain area.  The importance of 
this determination is grounded in the Court’s reliance in Raich on this 
point to distinguish the product at issue from those items in Lopez and 
Morrison and to connect it to precedent set in Wickard.  The Supreme 
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Court found Wickard and Raich had “striking” similarities; notably, both 
cases involved the “cultivating for home consumption, a fungible 
commodity, for which there is an established . . . interstate market.”231  
Both statutes, the AAA in Wickard and the CSA in Raich, had the goal of 
controlling the supply and demand of a fungible commodity on that 
market.232  The Raich court noted that “Congress’[s] power to regulate 
commerce includes the power to prohibit commerce in a particular 
commodity.”233  The CSA, in listing marijuana as a Schedule I drug, 
prohibits marijuana entirely.234  The Court held that homegrown 
marijuana intended for medical use is indistinguishable from other 
marijuana, and therefore, it may enter into the nationwide illegal market, 
which would frustrate the purpose of the comprehensive regulation.235  
The Court relied on the characterization of marijuana as a commodity in 
order to label the “activity” of Raich economic and thereby within 
Congress’s commerce power.236  It follows that despite my qualm with 
the characterization of a “fungible commodity” as an “activity,” this 
factor in the balancing test must stay true to the decision in Raich by 
allowing congressional regulation when the product in question is 
fungible and/or a commodity.  “But at some level, everything is unique; 
fungibility is a matter of degree.”237 
The Raich decision altered not only the Ninth Circuit’s standards of 
what constituted a comprehensive regulatory scheme, as described supra, 
but also the court’s concept of commodity.  In Stewart I, the Ninth 
Circuit contrasted Stewart’s homemade machineguns with wheat.238  
Wheat was a “staple commodity” that Fillburn would have otherwise 
purchased had he not grown it, whereas Stewart would likely not have 
purchased a machinegun if he had not constructed his own.239  Stewart II 
reached a different conclusion, basing the definition of commodity on the 
existence of a nationwide market for the product, even if that particular 
item did not travel in interstate commerce.240 
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The Patton court struggled with the concept of commodity, as it 
recognized that Raich used it in the context of “consumption.”241  The 
Patton ruling defined “consumption” as the “act of destroying a thing by 
using it; the use of a thing in a way that thereby exhausts it.”242  The 
court did not rule specifically if body armor is in fact a “fungible 
commodity” as Raich would require, but instead dismissed the case 
because the statute was not a total prohibition against body armor.243  Yet 
it still appears that the court had difficulty in divorcing “consumption” 
from “commodity,” so if a product cannot be consumed, it cannot be a 
commodity. 
The Patton commodity definition clashes with the D.C. Circuit’s 
definition in reference to child pornography.244  In United States v. 
Sullivan, the D.C. Circuit defined child pornography as a commodity 
because the duplication of the product through trading gave it more 
economic qualities.245  The court stated that because of the “viral 
character” of digital images, even if the original is destroyed, the 
subsequent copies many continue to multiply as the commodity is still 
traded.246  This peculiar twist on the definition of commodity lends more 
support to the idea that these definitions are often twisted to fit the 
preferences of the court based on the intrastate product in question. 
4. Do Congressional Findings Show a Connection to Interstate 
Commerce or Another Reasonable Purpose for Federal Regulation? 
Lastly, courts must review congressional findings as to how the 
product affects interstate commerce, as well as the other reasons 
Congress gives to regulate the product.  Particular congressional findings 
are not required, nor does the lack of findings do anything to minimize 
congressional authority, but they are nonetheless helpful in evaluating 
Congress’s intention and to allow courts to judge the interstate nexus.247  
The lack of findings was a pitfall of the GFSZA in Lopez,248 and the 
Supreme Court rejected the findings in Morrison that attempted to 
connect VAWA to interstate commerce.249 
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Although the jurisdictional hook may no longer be required in the 
wake of Raich,250 the Court does provide for one check, albeit broad: 
“We need not determine whether respondents’ activities, taken in the 
aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only 
whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.”251  Congress’s 
declaration that a regulation affects interstate commerce is not unlike a 
jurisdictional hook in that it is not “a talisman that wards off 
constitutional challenges.”252  The rational basis test has extended into 
most evaluations of Commerce Clause cases.253 
In addition to these other factors to evaluate, it remains important 
for our basic notion of federalism for courts to at least consider if 
Congress is overstepping its powers.  This evaluation should be based on 
the traditional role of the federal government, and should consider if the 
reasoning behind the regulation is superfluous.  The motivation behind 
the body armor felon-in-possession statute was a reaction to high-profile 
police battles with armored criminals.254  Child pornography legislation 
is justified with an explanation of the effects that this sexual exploitation 
has on the children who are victimized.255 
Even the Raich court conceded that congressional findings are not 
infallible, as Justice Stevens agrees that marijuana does have a 
therapeutic purpose as noted in the Compassionate Use Act, despite 
Congress’s classification of marijuana as a Schedule I drug that has no 
legitimate medical use.256  The Patton court found a similar problem with 
the congressional findings that felons who possessed body armor were 
dangerous,257 because the court believed wearing body armor is a self-
defense tactic that reduces crime.258 
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V. APPLYING THE FOURTH CATEGORY’S FOUR FACTOR TEST 
A. Montana Firearms Would Likely be Exempt from Congressional 
Regulation 
This analysis will rest on the assumption that the product in 
question conforms with all three MFFA requirements: (1) the firearm, 
whether handgun or rifle, was manufactured in Montana or another 
respective state; (2) the firearm must have the “Made in Montana” stamp 
on a large metal portion; and (3) the firearm must not have traveled in 
interstate commerce.” 
1. Does the Constitution Grant the Product Special Treatment? 
The status of firearms as a constitutionally protected product is 
nascent. The Supreme Court ruled in District of Columbia v. Heller259 
that the Second Amendment recognizes the pre-existing civil right of an 
individual to keep and bear arms.260  The Court further stated in 
McDonald v. Chicago261 that the Second Amendment right to keep and 
bear arms is “among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of 
ordered liberty.”262 
Yet, “[l]ike most rights, the right secured by the Second 
Amendment is not unlimited.”263  The Court was not clear about what 
standard should apply in evaluating federal firearms regulations, only 
that the mere “rational basis” scrutiny would not be enough.264  The 
review of gun control laws is supposed to be rigorous;265 however, the 
degree to which that has been true in the lower courts is mixed.  Judge J. 
Harvie Wilkinson III, although critical of both Heller and Roe v. Wade, 
declared them “two of the most important decisions of the modern 
judicial era.  They now together cast a long shadow over contemporary 
constitutional law.”266  Other analysis, however, has shown that the 
practical effect on the lower federal courts has been minimal.267 
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Although Justice Scalia stated in a footnote that the current firearms 
regulations are “presumptively lawful,” there is nothing in the Heller 
opinion that suggests that the current federal gun control laws could 
stand absolutely.268  The only regulation directly upheld in Heller was the 
one questioned in United States v. Miller269 on short-barreled shotguns.270  
Heller distinguishes Miller to apply only to that particular statute.271  A 
district court in the Second Circuit was one of the first courts to 
recognize that the Second Amendment “creates an individual right to 
possess a firearm unrelated to any military purpose, it also establishes a 
protectible [sic] liberty interest.”272  Although the Supreme Court has yet 
to define what restrictions can properly be placed on firearms possession, 
circuit courts would be wise to respect the states that choose to impose 
less restrictive means on a recognized civil right. 
In MSSA, the court discounted the plaintiffs’ claim at oral argument 
that the Second Amendment requires strict scrutiny of the GCA.273  First, 
the plaintiffs did not make an appropriate constitutional claim.274  That 
notwithstanding, although McDonald has recognized the individual 
fundamental right to possess a handgun in the home for self-defense, this 
does not extend to the right to manufacture and sell firearms.275 
2. Is the Regulation a Comprehensive Regulatory Scheme? 
The GCA is the primary regulation that the MFFA seeks to avoid.  
Several rulings have declared the GCA a “comprehensive regulatory 
scheme,” even prior to the importance that Raich put on the term.276  This 
factor weighs heavily against the MFFA, although it might not apply for 
all of the individual restrictions. Some parts of the GCA intend to keep 
firearms away from particular classes of people.277  In that regard, the 
GCA is comprehensive.278  Through its findings in MSSA, the court made 
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the comparison between the GCA and the CSA, as the Ninth Circuit did 
in Stewart II.279  Yet this is not a universal application. 
Another issue with analyzing many aspects of the GCA, including 
the felon-in-possession provisions, is that the relevant cases were decided 
in the 1970s, resulting in few being subject to reexamination.  There is 
also the issue of whether the entire market for firearms should be 
regulated, as opposed to only specific instances.  A strong argument can 
be made that only statutes such as 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), banning 
machineguns entirely, constitute a comprehensive regulation of the 
market.  This would bring machineguns in line with marijuana. In order 
to fully understand the effect the articulation of the fourth category of the 
commerce power in relation to the GCA, each individual provision, and 
its aims would have to be considered separately.  
3. Is the Product a Fungible Commodity? 
The MFFA attempts to cure the problem of fungibility by 
mandating that all firearms include a “Made in Montana” stamp on a 
“central metallic part.”280  There is no such provision for the accessories 
or ammunition, however.  Regardless of the markings, there has been 
uncertainty by courts and scholars regarding whether firearms are 
fungible.  The Fifth Circuit, in the lower court case for Lopez, 
determined that, “firearms do not have the fungible and untraceable 
characteristics of narcotics,” a prescient comparison.281  Other courts and 
commentators have sparred over determining the fungibility of 
firearms.282 
Perhaps a reason for this confusion is that fungibility also varies 
from the viewpoint of the observer and the purpose of the user.  That is 
to say that some guns are better suited for crimes than others, but even 
so, the criminal could just as easily find another gun to fit her needs to 
commit a crime.283  With this ambiguity, and keeping in mind the 
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warning that “fungibility is a matter of degree,”284 it would only favor the 
constitutionality of the MFFA by having additional markings that would 
make the firearm distinguishable.  Randy Barnett, the counsel for Raich, 
speculated that the MFFA may need to require more markings as one 
way of assuring the federal government that the intrastate products can 
be distinguished on the national market.285  In MSSA, the court quoted 
Raich and called firearms “commodities for which there is an 
established, lucrative interstate market”286 but did not consider the actual 
definition of “commodity.”  Courts continue to incorrectly label any 
object a “commodity” in order to fit it into the flawed Lopez framework, 
which likewise incorrectly equates “product” with “activity.” 
4. Do Congressional Findings Show a Connection to Interstate 
Commerce or Another Reasonable Purpose for Federal Regulation? 
Finally, the congressional findings will vary depending on the exact 
statute in question.  Congress can say whatever it wants to in the way of 
congressional findings. Lopez is an example where congressional 
findings could not save a federal gun regulation.287  In the Fifth Circuit 
case of Lopez, the court rejected the government’s theory, harshly 
criticizing it: “If Congress can thus bar firearms possession because of 
such a nexus to the grounds of any public or private school, and can do 
so without supportive findings or legislative history, on the theory that 
education affects commerce, then it could also similarly ban lead pencils, 
‘sneakers,’ Game Boys, or slide rules.”288  Though the Fifth Circuit 
would not speak to the potential approval with modified findings,289 the 
government did not rely on the findings of § 922(q) as they existed when 
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presented to the Supreme Court, nor the amended version that stands in 
the current statute.290 
Congressional findings that are appropriate for this evaluation come 
in many forms.  Findings that show a nexus between the regulation of a 
product at issue and interstate commerce may be difficult to uphold, as 
these are mostly criminal laws that are traditionally left to the states.  
Other findings that intend to regulate a specific firearm or accessory, 
including machineguns or body armor, will vary based on the end goal of 
the statute.  Under § 922(o), machineguns are banned entirely, and 
therefore, the congressional findings that explain the merits of the 
elimination of this product’s market will help weigh in favor of a court 
permitting the regulation.291  On the other hand, § 931 bans body armor 
for felons, and congressional findings made pursuant to this statute elude 
only to the danger of felons specifically possessing body armor, but 
make no comment about the national market.292  In this case, because 
there is not an absolute ban on firearms, the government would not be 
able to make a strong argument on those grounds.  The federal 
government’s argument would have to be tailored to issues regarding the 
regulation of the national market, which creates complications as 
explained supra. 
5. The Factors Weigh In Favor of Upholding the MFFA 
Thanks to the Heller and McDonald decisions, firearms are in a 
unique position, as they are one of a handful of products that have special 
Constitutional protections.293  Although gun laws are lengthy and many 
courts have considered the GCA to be a comprehensive regulatory 
scheme, it is not as comprehensive when considered on a statute-by-
statute basis, or perhaps more appropriately, on a product-by-product 
basis.  We will only learn which federal gun control regulations will 
prevail when the federal government enforces these statutes against an 
individual who is adhering to his states’ firearms freedom act.  The 
MFFA is explicit in its attempt to eliminate the issue of fungibility by 
using markings, a unique solution to a difficult problem.  Accordingly, 
congressional findings in this area will come under greater scrutiny, and 
again, will vary based on the specific regulation.  In this environment, 
the MFFA will likely succeed. 
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B. The Application of the Products Category’s Balancing Test Still 
Upholds Federal Regulations on Intrastate Child Pornography and 
Marijuana 
Testing the fourth category with precedent demonstrates that it 
does, in fact, already exist.  The regulation of child pornography and 
marijuana, would still be permitted.  Although no court has explicitly 
laid out these factors in determining the constitutionality of such 
restrictions, application of the balancing test leaves these decisions on 
firmer ground. 
1. Child Pornography  
Child pornography cases have borne out significant legislation 
recently in many different aspects of the law, but the end result has been 
consistent: federal law outlaws intrastate child pornography.   These 
cases have been particularly useful in finding the threads that connect to 
create the fourth category.  First, there is no constitutional protection of 
child pornography under the First Amendment, so this prong weighs in 
favor of Congress.  Such speech has been used by the Supreme Court as 
an example of a type “fully outside the protection of the First 
Amendment.”294 
Second, child pornography regulations have often been found to be 
comprehensive.  The CPPA has been called comprehensive by the 
Sixth,295 Seventh,296 Ninth,297 Tenth,298 Eleventh,299 and the District of 
Columbia Circuits.300  District courts in other circuits have relied on 
some of these decisions and quoted their analyses on the 
comprehensiveness of the CPPA.301  Although there are several courts 
that have not opted to bestow the CPPA with the “comprehensive” 
distinction, the courts have still upheld its constitutionality.302  In many 
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instances, the analysis noted the importance of the suppression of the 
entire market of child pornography.303  The CPPA explains that its 
purpose is to “eliminate the market for the sexual exploitative use of 
children” by “prohibiting the possession and viewing of child 
pornography.”304  This leaves no exceptions to the rule and focuses the 
regulation on the product itself. 
Third, the fungibility of child pornography has been analyzed in 
federal courts.  Some courts have deemed that child pornography is a 
fungible commodity and have not differentiated it from the wheat in 
Wickard or the marijuana in Raich.305  The D.C. Circuit considered child 
pornography to have even greater commodity characteristics because 
sharing child pornography actually increases the supply.306  The 
consumption of the product actually creates more of it, rather than 
diminishing it.307  The court additionally recognized the fungibility of 
child pornography and how it could be diverted from intrastate into 
interstate markets.308  On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit, in a pre-Raich 
case, held that a single photo of a mother and her daughter partially 
undressed was not fungible because the mother had no intention of 
exchanging it for more child pornography or for any other economic 
reasons.309 
Fourth, there are significant congressional findings for the 
regulation of child pornography.  It focuses primarily on the serious 
long-term effects that sexual exploitation has on children, a protected 
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class in our society.310  Child pornography that is intrastate could be 
ensnared by congressional regulations under the fourth category.   
2. Marijuana  
Although one could simply take Raich to declare federal drug 
regulations such as the CSA constitutional, the balancing test of the 
fourth category bares out the same conclusion.  First, there is no right to 
marijuana under any amendment to the Constitution.  Second, Raich sets 
the standard in explaining the comprehensive regulatory scheme of the 
CSA.311  Justice Stevens devotes considerable ink to describing the 
history of the CSA and why it is a prime example of this ideal regulatory 
scheme.312  Third, the fungibility of marijuana, like wheat in Wickard, is 
without question.313  Raich clearly outlined this characteristic, which is 
what makes it such an important factor in the current jurisprudence.  
Likewise, the fourth and final category, congressional findings, were 
found to be sufficient in Raich.314  With all four factors on their side, 
Congress would still be justified in regulating intrastate marijuana. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Regardless of the outcome in Montana’s federal case, the MFFA 
and related challenges are not going away.  Criticism of Congress’s 
heavy regulatory hand has come in large part from the actions it has 
taken with its Commerce Clause power.  The authority that courts vested 
in Congress in the last century, despite a brief turnaround, continues to 
dominate the federal landscape.  Lopez, Morrison, Raich, and 
Scarborough are four cases that cannot peaceably coexist within the 
current three-category framework if we are to consider consistency in the 
circuit courts and restraint of the national government as part of our legal 
system.  Lopez gave us what it intended to be three all-inclusive 
categories, but it falls short.  A fourth category has emerged in scattered 
strands in various cases in the federal circuit courts, but no court has 
been willing or able to pull them all together.  Now, Montana and other 
states are using the MFFA to fire a shot directly at the courts, urging 
them to stop talking and to take action.315  A fourth category exclusively 
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for intrastate products will bring together all of the Commerce Clause 
cases that are currently in great tension with one another.  When courts 
are upfront that the product itself is actually what is evaluated, 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence will no longer be an easy target for 
criticism. 
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Court’s more recent decisions is not for this Court to remedy.”). 
